TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet Documents

Reference	Date
COS(41) 142nd meeting	21 April 1941

The above-listed Cabinet document(s), which was/were enclosed on this file, has/have been removed and destroyed.

For complete series of Cabinet documents see CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed _____ Date _____

Eastern operations.)

COPY

20th September 1941.

F/3520/115/143.1.

Would you kindly pass the two cheques enclosed to Mr. Sherwood on our behalf?

The larger cheque is in settlement of $102,202 drawn in New York: the smaller cheque is to repay advances from H.M. Ambassador at Lisbon, referred to in your telegram No. 470 of the 20th March.

I take it you will forward us the official receipts in due course?

(Signed) R.C. Brook

J.N.Addis, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

Eastern operations.)

COPY

20th September 1941.

F/5945/115.

3rd February, 1942.

SD: Cy/YD/566/FD.

8th April 1942.

TO: C.E.O.

FROM: S/YD.

SECRET

Will you kindly have the attached cheque for £26,391. 16. 0. [Twenty-five thousand three hundred & ninety-one pounds sixteen shillings] forwarded to Mr.Sherwood at the Foreign Office and obtain for me his receipt.

This, so far as Sherwood is concerned, who is expecting my cheque, is in settlement of $112,202 drawn from YP New York on YPL account.

For your information, it is a further payment in respect of "Aspidistra" which P.W.E. and Sambier Parry asked me to effect for them through the Foreign Office - see Foreign Office telegram to Washington No.1951 of the 26th March 1942.

I, of course, have received a corresponding amount from Sambier Parry.

Rt. Hon. Lord Hankey, G.C.B.,G.C.M.G.,G.C.V.O.,
Privy Council Office.
Whitehall.
S.W.1.

*) [illegible] (or some [illegible]
Eastern operations.)

COPY

20th September 1941.

F/S245/115.

3rd February, 1942.

I understand, from Cairncross, that you have very kindly agreed to sponsor our organisation with Mr. McQueen of the General Electric Company. As you know, it is not easy for us to introduce ourselves and we are very glad that you can vouch for us.

The request we have to put before him is an urgent one concerning the secondment of a radio supplies officer. If we come to McQueen under your auspices, he, as chairman of the Radio Manufacturers' Association, is the most likely person to find us a suitable man in the trade.

(Sgd:-) GLADWYN JEBB.

Rt. Hon. Lord Hankey, G.C.B.,G.C.M.G.,G.C.V.O.,
Privy Council Office,
Whitehall,
S.W.1.

[illegible] (or some other [illegible] Eastern operations.)

COPY

20th September 1941.

From: C.D.

CD/XX/806

26th January 1942.

rsonnel.

urth Progress Report by
which as you will see
by S.O.

if some one on your
h this to see if we are
y which I mean whether
a means of pressing our
and when required.

s anything it infers that
skilled personnel for the
ch we were told so much
ts!

C. D.

F/115

4.2.42.

From: D/TB.A.

The Cabinet Report on skilled radio personnel
scarcely seems to affect us, since our demands for the
type of men discussed is very small, and our staff has
so far been obtained mainly from sources other than
those mentioned.

We may, however, be indirectly affected, by the
pressure on our sources of supply being less in future.

DWB/OR/566.

To: D/2.

Eastern operations.)

COPY

20th September 1941.

From C.D. Noted

To [illegible] and AD/[illegible].

CD/XX/806

26th January 1942.

Skilled Radio Personnel.

1. I attach herewith Fourth Progress Report by Lord Hankey on the above, which as you will see has been sent down to us by S.O.

2. It might be as well if some one on your staff were to read through this to see if we are in any way interested - by which I mean whether we could not use this as a means of pressing our demands for personnel if and when required.

3. If paragraph 32 means anything it infers that the enormous shortage of skilled personnel for the fighting services, of which we were told so much last year, no longer exists!

C. D.

do the [illegible]

[illegible] (for some [illegible]
Eastern operations.)

COPY

20th September 1941.

My dear Air Commodore,

U R G E N T.

ADZ/OR/763 30.1.42.

TO: C.E.O. FROM: AD/Z

1. As you are seeing Lord HANKEY this morning, I wondered whether you could possibly ask him to tell Mr. MCQUEEN of the General Electric Co., who is on Lord HANKEY's Wireless Committee and Chairman of the Radio Manufacturers Association, that the Department represented by me is a respectable one and that Mr. MCQUEEN should give us all the assistance he can.

2. The point at issue is actually the acquirement of a radio supplies officer for my department, who can negotiate supplies of radio equipment and generally act for me on matters concerning the Wireless Section of Station IX.

3. Mr. MCQUEEN, with his position as Chairman of the Radio Manufacturers Association, is supposed to be the most likely person to find a man out of the trade who will be suitable for our work.

4. The requirement is an urgent one and I should be glad if you would impress this on Lord HANKEY.

Mr Brook

I failed to pass this on to Lord H. when I saw him last week. Could you please get in touch with Mr. Cairncross (Lord H's secretary) & get him to do the necessary? A. 31/1

spoke 2/2

Eastern operations.)

COPY

20th September 1941.

My dear Air Commodore,

With reference to our talk yesterday

20 SEP 1941

From C.D.

To C.E.O. 20th September 1941.

Communications.

I enclose herewith copy of a letter from Gambier-Parry to AD/P, with attachment.

I have not yet studied it very closely, but AD/P, A.D. and I, after cursory examination, are all inclined to feel that there is very little to cavil at, so far as one can view the situation at present.

C. D.

Wonderful!

Eastern operations.)

COPY

20th September 1941.

My dear Air Commodore,

With reference to our talk yesterday evening I have, for some considerable time, felt that many of the misunderstandings which have arisen in connection with my liaison work with S.O.2 have been due to the difficulty

CEDS copy

23 SEP 1941

COPY

C.D. to AD/P 22.9.41.

Yes - "further outlook settled weather" is a fair description at present.

We must certainly meet him half way in his request for a meeting with C.S. heads etc.

I'm a little afraid of inviting him to Planning Meetings - he would hear so much which would go to all sorts of quarters!

Afraid it means another "special" meeting, but please discuss with relevant parties and do what you think best.

C. D.

Eastern operations.)

COPY

20th September 1941.

My dear Air Commodore,

With reference to our talk yesterday evening I have, for some considerable time, felt that many of the misunderstandings which have arisen in connection with my liaison work with S.O.2 have been due to the difficulty of my not having closer contact with the heads of country sections, as a whole, and that just meeting them individually, as I have done from time to time, has not

COPY

ADP/XX/155 22.9.41.

To C.D. From AD/P

The attached note from Long who is looking after part of Gambier-Parry's show during the latter's absence in U.S.A., is satisfactory and I hope you will agree with me that it will be of considerable value if I can arrange for a weekly meeting with Long. I wonder whether it would be possible to have him to our weekly Planning Meeting which is held normally on Thursdays but in any case, if you agree, I will go ahead and inform AD/Z and E who are naturally interested.

I think we can say in this part of our sphere, at least, there are reasonably good prospects of continuance of fine weather.

A.B.

Air Commodore A. Boyle,
C.M.G., O.B.E., M.C.

*/ [illegible] (for some [illegible]
Eastern operations.)

COPY

20th September 1941.

My dear Air Commodore,

With reference to our talk yesterday evening I have, for some considerable time, felt that many of the misunderstandings which have arisen in connection with my liaison work with S.O.2 have been due to the difficulty of my not having closer contact with the heads of country sections, as a whole, and that just meeting them individually, as I have done from time to time, has not made it possible to get down to a defined general policy.

As I told you some six months ago, when I first took on the liaison with S.I.S., equivalent of your country sections, much the same difficulties prevailed. A.C.S.S. has now been for some time prepared to work closely with me and deal with the problems which arise and questions of major policy with the sections which come under his control.

I feel sure that if you could see your way to arranging for, at present, a weekly meeting with yourself in the chair and the heads of your country sections which I could attend, much progress would be made in solving the many little problems which they have in regard to W/T communication. It would also give me the opportunity of meeting them and working more closely with them for I can assure you that it is only by this means that I feel I can be of real service.

At present I am in London every Tuesday and then later in the week, usually Friday, dealing with S.I.S. communications. If neither of these days are suitable to you I shall be only too glad to attend on some other day of the week, except Thursdays which is the day I have alloted to your school at Grendon Underwood.

I can assure you that I am more than anxious to try and get your communication problem running as smoothly and establish as friendly relations with your country sections as those which now exist with myself and the S.I.S. Sections.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) C.H. LONG

Squadron Leader.

Air Commodore A. Boyle,
C.M.G., O.B.E., M.C.

*/ [illegible] (Air Force [illegible]
Eastern Operations.)

COPY

18th September 1941.

My dear Archie,

I am sorry I did not keep my promise in writing to you yesterday, but I ran into a pretty considerable jam with our American friends who are over here.

The three matters we discussed are summarised below. These seem to resolve the principle outstanding problems relating to S.O.2 communications policy.

1. We are arranging for the installation by our engineering staff of a transmitting and receiving station in the Shetlands. This station will not be used until operational requirements dictate. It will be tested with a low-powered station being operated by an agent from Norway, and it will also be tested for communications with my base headquarters.

The operators for this station will be ear-marked and kept in reserve in the event that it is likely to be required for operational purposes.

2. Increased base station facilities. At a meeting last Friday C.D. expressed the doubt whether facilities at my base station were sufficient to safeguard the interests of S.O.2 in the event that the whole, or part, of their major plans came to maturity and a large numbers of organisers and operators were parashot, or otherwise delivered, in an area of practical operations. I explained to C.D. that an additional station duplicating that which is now used for the reception of radio equipped agents was in effect in the course of preparation, and assured him that this station and its appropriate personnel would be ready to deal with any operational situation by the time it would arise.

My yard-stick on base station requirements is essentially the number of agents under training for S.I.S. operations which is always known to us, plus the number of agents under final W/T training for S.O.2 at their establishment at Grendon Underwood. At the present moment these two requirements are about equal and are quite modest.

It is realised however that there must be a considerable increase in the number of trained W/T agents operating for S.O.2 if the plans submitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee mature. I have, therefore, agreed that the duplicate station referred to above shall be used exclusively for communication between my base station and S.O.2 agents so long as the number of agents justifies.

3. Foreign Communications controlled by S.O.2. At last Friday's meeting, and previously at other meetings, S.O. and Lt.Colonel Taylor have pressed C.S.S. for his agreement with the policy that S.O.2 should conduct their own communication systems between base stations working with secret agents situated at the following four points:-

1) North Eastern Indian Frontier for operations into Afghanistan, Waziristan and Persia.

2) Lagos for operations in West Africa.

3) Cairo for operations in the Middle and Near East and the Balkan countries.

4) Singapore (or some other suitable point for Far Eastern operations.)

The implied arrangement is that S.O.2 base stations at these four points should receive communications from secret agents and transmit messages to them, but that the resultant intelligence should follow the normal procedure and be transmitted home on existing S.I.S. main line channels.

C.S.S. sent me this proposal for observations. I have observed to him and at the meeting last Friday that I am in perfect agreement with the proposals with the following qualifications:-

1) That S.O.2 provide the personnel and equipment of the base stations at all four points.

2) That S.O.2 undertake the training and equipping of the secret agents.

3) That S.O.2 undertake the provision of suitable sets for use by the agents.

4) That the local S.I.S. representative will co-operate in every way possible and provide full information to the local S.O.2 representative of our experience and knowledge of operating secret communication channels, but his responsibilities end with the provision of such advice and he has no responsibility whatsoever that the resultant communications operate.

5) That before allocating frequencies for use by either a base station or secret agents, the S.O.2 representative will consult the local S.I.S. signals representative to ensure that there is no mutual interference and that the best frequencies are chosen to ensure satisfactory results.

With regard to (4) a telegram, of which I attach a copy, has been received from our representative at Singapore, which appears to make a counter proposal to the suggestion of your London Head office for independent communications in the Far East.

I consider that the proposal in this telegram is the ideal solution to the problem; but if the principal Executives of your organisation consider that despite this joint recommendation of their representative and ours, an entirely independent organisation should be set up in the Far East, I am still only too ready to co-operate and afford every possible assistance.

Yours ever,

(Signed) SAMBELE .

16 SEP 1941
W

F.03

MOST SECRET

[illegible] ITALY.

For some time past it has been obvious that [illegible] to be a serious and frequently troublesome [illegible] secret communications.

[illegible] plans for [illegible] countries [illegible] a second reason [illegible] the country, a vital factor is that of establishing [illegible] communication with [illegible] in the countries concerned.

The extreme importance and the increasing difficulties of secret communications in connection with our activities has been stressed by the [illegible] of State [illegible] and it is [illegible] there.

It is apparent, and [illegible] that the present [illegible] Cairo and Istanbul will not be able to cope with the secret communications which are envisaged in the very near future and which, as stated, are vital to the success of our operations and, subject to the necessary [illegible], it is desired to construct wireless stations at Cairo and Istanbul for our present and future secret communications. This would relieve the present congestion of the extreme priority and overloading which exists at the Foreign Office, thus facilitating and expediting receipt and despatch of the communications and thus [illegible] for other departments.

The estimated cost of purchasing the necessary material [illegible] to [illegible] of which [illegible] acquire [illegible] in the country) and erection amounts to [illegible] It is requested that further sanctions be given [illegible] up to this figure.

The running costs of such stations will not be heavy and it is [illegible] that [illegible] may be met out of the general sanction (sanction 1) for the Middle-East.

E. J. 2.
12/9/41.

COPY

FROM SINGAPORE GLOW. 15.9.41.

CXG 43.

Addressed London 43

Following for C.S.S. from

A. C.M. and myself propose to pool our communications in Far East, in British territory, and in non British territory whenever practicable.

B. Priority of operations will be decided at joint meetings.

C. I proposed that ROSHER be put in charge of S.O.2 as well as operate S.I.S. communications out here, and that KNOTT should be his assistant. C.M. approves.

D. ROSHER would therefore in future put up to for approval both S.O.2 and S.I.S. equipment requirements.

E. S.O.2 would bear their proportion of communications expenses.

F. I strongly recommend your approval which is requested urgently in view of pending joint equipment estimates.

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

/In N.A.

MONT [illegible].

Copy No. [illegible]

ADZ/WT/S.O.2.

9.8.41.

S.O.2. COMMUNICATIONS

and

THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH S.I.S.

(1) Our relationship with the "C" Organisation as regards Communications is defined in Annex II of a paper dated October, 1940, entitled "Subversion". The relevant passage reads:-

> "S will continue to afford to D such facilities for the use of S.I.S. officers and communications as to requirements and security of S.I.S. permit, but these communications will remain under the control of C. S.O.II, for instance, a telegram submitted by D, for transmission by C, be rejected by the latter, C.D. will, of course, be informed, in which case he will endeavour to make other arrangements."

(2) The PRESENT POSITION is as follows:-

(a) Agents in the field.

All communications with all agents operating illicit W/T are catered for by S.I.S. In practice, this confines itself almost entirely to Western Europe, with one exception - an agent in Roumania.

(b) Communications between British Dependencies and Neutral Countries to and from U.K.

S.O.2. have recently instituted their own Codes Department and are gradually relieving [illegible] from S.I.S. [illegible] to commercial or Service channels. They do, however, rely on S.I.S. for certain countries and would always like to have the use of S.I.S. main channel on priority as an emergency. S.I.S. are in agreement with this arrangement, as it relieves them of a great deal of routine traffic.

(3) S.O.2. feel that as regards communications based on U.K. (i.e. France to U.K., Norway to U.K., etc.) all illicit traffic from Occupied Countries should be handled by S.I.S.

Micro-wave communication will, however, be handled by S.O.2. and [illegible] jointly. [illegible] S.I.S. could be a partner [illegible] set up to exploit this system of communication, should they so think it.

(4) S.O.2. would [illegible] the right to use their own [illegible] S.I.S. would, [illegible], refuse to operate the requests of S.O.2's research department.

(5) As regards communications to and from British territories into other territories, S.O.2. would have the right to set up their own channels of communication, naturally also the Col. Control [illegible] fully informed of their intentions and progress. This will also apply to interconnections between S.O.2. main line channels, i.e. Cairo to Singapore, etc.

(6) As regards communication back to U.K. from S.O.2. main line stations, S.O.2. will continue to use commercial and Service lines (see para. (2)(a)) and will not set up a station

/in U.K.

[illegible] for transmission or reception to [illegible] with [illegible] statements, [illegible] [illegible] removal of [illegible].

(7) [illegible] will act as a [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

POST SECRET.

Copy to 9

D.Dn/ST/46.

31.7.41.

W/T COMMUNICATIONS IN OCCUPIED AREAS

/SGHQ.

4th August, 1941.

[illegible] for your letter of the [illegible] which you returned my set of papers on S.O.2 long-term objectives.

I should have replied before, but I had rather hoped to see you last week-end in the country and was sorry to hear that you were feeling bad; I hope you are better now.

I am afraid it is a bit difficult for me to let you have copies of the documents concerned. Nobody else has them outside the organisation except the Chiefs of Staff, and if it got out that I had given them to you I am afraid that there might be awkwardness in other quarters!

I am really glad that your meeting with the Planners the other day was a success, and it looks as if we were beginning to see daylight at the end of the tunnel.

Colonel Gambier-Parry.

[illegible]

/arrange

WEST SHEET.

Copy No 9

[illegible]/560.

31.7.41.

[illegible] W/T COMMUNICATIONS IN [illegible] AREA.

1st August, 1941.

My dear Jebb,

I am very much obliged to you for letting me have the enclosed papers. I am sending them back to you by the hand of Squadron Leader Long who I think you know. He is the liaison officer on communications matters between my organisation and S.O.E.

I am very glad to have had this opportunity to study, for the first time, the long term objectives of S.O.E., and it has helped me immensely in getting a focus on what may be their communication requirements. I [illegible] are you will not mind my remarking that some of the references to existing communications in the paper "S.O. 882" of the 21st April, are a little optimistic in fact!

We had a satisfactory meeting in the Cabinet Offices yesterday at which Davis tabled some requirements for sets which are in themselves perfectly easy to realise in terms of equipment. The old problem of highly expert personnel at this end for the reception of the resulting traffic, is likely to be the thing which is the most difficult to overcome; and I suggested that whatever the Chiefs of Staff Committee may decide with regard to the whole project, a strong recommendation should be made now that if it is to be supported by the proper proportion of communications, the question of expert man-power should come under examination immediately.

Davis of course admitted, and quite rightly, that the requirements, as tabled, were something of a shot in the dark, and that each number might vary in the different countries plus or minus. But it does, at any rate, give us some yard-stick to work on. We are having a further meeting of Boyle, Davis, myself and others concerned to study other requirements elsewhere, but I think the right [illegible] now that we have this yard-stick, would be for S.O.E. to let us have an abridged

/over

P. At the present stage, it is virtually [illegible] [illegible] to a discretion [illegible], as, [illegible], he [illegible] himself with suitable cover, [illegible] to

/arrange

version of the operational plans envisaged, so that we can apply to it our trained communication brains and recommend what communications should be provided to make the operations successful, and how these should best be conducted. In other words let the communication experts contribute to the formation of the plan in the same way as do the explosive experts or the experts in parachute dropping and air transport.

If it were possible for me to have a copy to retain of each of these three documents I would be very grateful, and give you my assurance that they would not depart from my personal safe.

Yours sincerely,

Alanbrooke

Gladwyn Jebb, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

POST SECRET.

Copy No 9

[illegible]/AT/568.

31.7.41.

W/T [illegible]

(Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France - Czechoslovakia and Poland are excluded, as they have their own sets and means of communication)

GENERAL.

2 - AUG 1941

W/-

S.T.

ADM/P/545

1.8.41.

To: The C.S.O.

F.O.: AT/2

I attach copy of the paper which was submitted to the meeting of the F.O.P.S. yesterday afternoon.

This involves both the Secret Organisations and the Secret Armies; and if these are to be properly treated from London, the time on the air is likely to be almost as the sum over a period of, say, one month, and will depend on the progress of the organisations.

2. At the present stage, it is virtually impossible, and it would be, to give [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible] with a [illegible] of [illegible]. It is [illegible] to be discreet [illegible], as, [illegible] it, [illegible] itself with a suitable cover, [illegible] it is virtually impossible to

POST STAMP.

Copy No 9

[illegible]/7/SOE.

31.7.41.

u/T [illegible]
[illegible]
(Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France -
Czechoslovakia and Poland are excluded, as
they have their own sets and means of
communication)

GENERAL.

A. S.O.E. work, as elaborated in our policy paper which is now under discussion, deals with two aspects:-

(a) Sabotage and propaganda Organisations

(b) Secret armies.

The operational processes leading up to the point when (a) and (b) will operate at their maximum are, roughly, as follows:-

(1) Organisers are infiltrated into the countries in question, also stores and equipment.

From a W/T point of view, the chief role of the operator is to indicate to London and receive information as to where and when the organisers in the first instance, and stores in the second, should be [illegible]; it should not involve the operators in sending lengthy messages in parting intelligence. As a consequence thereof, the communication will be only tentative and should not involve much commitment as far as London is concerned.

This first phase of S.O.E. work should take somewhat [illegible] six months at least.

(2) The second phase, which will overlap the first phase, will involve operations in an ever increasing tempo on the part of the Sabotage Groups, i.e. what to do and [illegible]. This, in terms of time on the air, will mean a considerable increase over the first phase, as intelligence will be fed to London from our [illegible], as to likely targets; decisions will have to be taken by London and directives issued as to how sabotage should be effected. Also, by this time, the propaganda [illegible] will be under way and this, again, will require directives from London.

(3) The third phase is the [illegible] of the active S.O.E. [illegible] in the occupied country in question, in conjunction with a combined attack from U.K.

This involves both the Sabotage Organisations and the Secret armies; and if these are to be properly directed from London, the time on the air is likely to be [illegible] continuous over a period up to six, nine months, [illegible] an extent on the progress of the operations.

B. At the present stage, it is virtually impossible, [illegible] to state [illegible] or not [illegible] a [illegible] of [illegible]. [illegible] to a discretion of the operator, as, of necessity, he has to provide himself with a suitable cover, [illegible] to

[illegible] SECRET.

Copy No 9

[illegible]/WT/560.

1.7.41.

W/T [illegible]
(Norway, Denmark, [illegible], Belgium, France -
Czechoslovakia and Poland are excluded, as
they have their own sets and means of
communication)

GENERAL.

A. S.O.E. work, as elaborated in our policy paper which is now under discussion, deals with two aspects:-

(a) Saboteur and propaganda Organisations

(b) Secret armies.

The operational processes leading up to the point when (a) and (b) will operate at their maximum are, roughly, as follows:-

(1) Organisers are infiltrated into the countries in question, also stores and equipment.

From a W/T point of view, the chief role of the operator is to indicate to London and receive information as to who are and where the organisers in the first instance, and stores in the second, [illegible] while the operators in sending lengthy messages in carrying intelligence. As a consequence thereof, the communication will be only periodic and also do not involve much commitment as far as London is concerned.

This first phase of S.O.E. work should take somewhere between six months and a year.

(2) The second phase, which will overlap the first phase, will involve operations in an ever increasing tempo on the part of the Saboteurs proper, i.e. out to damage enemy. This, in terms of time or the air, will mean a considerable increase over the first phase, as intelligence will be sent [illegible] from over there, as to likely targets; questions will have to be given [illegible] and directives issued as to how saboteurs should be effected. Also, by this time, the propaganda side should be under way and this, again, will require directives from London.

(3) The culmination of the [illegible] of the operations of S.O.E. machine in the occupied country in question, in conjunction with a combined attack from U.K.

This involves both the Saboteur organisation and the Secret Armies; and if these are to be properly directed from London, the time on the air will tend to be heavy over a period of two, one months, especially concerned on the progress of the operations.

B. At the present stage, it is virtually impossible, even in a rough way, to state exactly what [illegible] will be the number of messages. [illegible] to be discreet and [illegible], as, in consequence, he [illegible] himself with suitable cover, [illegible] to

/[illegible]

[illegible] at this end.

C. In this survey, we have omitted the question of internal [illegible]/T communication within the [illegible] themselves. At the report [illegible] it is [illegible] [illegible] more [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in question.

D. The following is a preliminary assessment of S.C.2. requirements as regards [illegible]/T [illegible] and sets in the under-mentioned countries.

1. NORWAY: As far as Norway is concerned, six areas are envisaged, to be situated, [illegible], in the [illegible], [illegible], Bergen, Stavanger, Kristiansand and Narvik areas.

Each station should have one set operational and one stand-by.

The sets, therefore, required for Norway, amount to [illegible].

2. DENMARK. Three stations will be required for Denmark, situated in the [illegible], [illegible] and [illegible] areas. Again, each station will have one set operational and one stand-by.

The sets, therefore, required for Denmark, are [illegible].

3. [illegible]. [illegible] will be required for Iceland in the following areas:-

[illegible] (2)
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
N. [illegible] (2)

The total number of sets required for Iceland is [illegible] (each one operational and one stand-by).

4. BELGIUM. [illegible] will be required for Belgium at the following areas:-

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] sets [illegible].

5. [illegible]. France is split up into [illegible]. It is [illegible] that [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible], one set of equipment and [illegible] are required for each [illegible] i.e. [illegible] sets.

... ...

Therefore, in the [illegible], the [illegible] to [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] sets [illegible] attached tables)

[illegible]	No. of [illegible]	No. of SITES	[illegible]
France	20	40	20 Zones
Norway	6	12	6 Zones
Denmark	3	6	3 Zones
Holland	9	18	9 Zones
Belgium	6	12	6 Zones
Total	47	94	

6 JUL 1944

6 JUL 1941
W/

[illegible] 1941.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

K.

Ref: W/2816

As reported to you on the telephone, it has come to [illegible] knowledge that A.I.5. (W section) have full manufacturing drawings of the small portable wireless as used by the Germans to-day.

Our source is particularly anxious that we should not reveal that we know this for a fact, but if you wish to pursue this line, you should merely ask if they happen to have any information on the topic.

RER

28th July 1941.

Perhaps you will pass this on to D.S.R. if you think suitable.

6 JUL 1941
W/-

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

6 JUL 1941
W/-

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

A. [illegible]

[illegible]

(a) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

(b) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] 20. 2[illegible] 1941 [illegible]

4/-

[illegible] : The C.D.O. : [illegible]

I am afraid I [illegible] in reinforcements to be sent to a reinforcement to the staff of Station IX (Foreign Section).

As you are aware, we are concentrating on the remaining development of the following:-

(1) [illegible] - [illegible] air; [illegible] parts. [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[redacted]

[redacted]. 24th May, 1941.

[redacted].

I send you herewith copies of two minutes by [redacted], dated [redacted]nd and 23rd May respectively, regarding a new transmitter, together with a draft telegram to Washington prepared by [redacted] after discussion with Venner.

You will see what the proposal is and you will also see that it has received the sanction of the Prime Minister. The whole matter is still very secret indeed and neither the B.B.C., nor the Ministry of Information at present knows anything about it.

In point of fact, the whole affair will be worked by M.O.I since the interruptions by the new "Great Voice" will take place at times which will have to be kept secret, and its function will be definitely "subversive" - so please keep the whole thing very much to yourself. The B.B.C. will only come into it so far as the enemy may try to indulge in jamming.

ROBIN is going off in the Clipper very shortly so we should be extremely grateful if the telegram to Washington could be sent without delay.

W.L. d'A. Hopkinson Esq.,
[redacted].

ACT 1958

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] AGENT.

[illegible]

[illegible] 23/3/41.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Registry
No.

M.E.W.

23rd May 1941.

MOST SECRET.

Draft. Telegram.

H.M. Ambassador.

Washington.

No.

(Cypher)

Dept. No. 1.

Please make available to

funds in such form and of such amounts as he may request not exceeding $450,000, and charge in accounts with F.O. as on YPX account;

Telegraph transfer of above amount is being made.

(Signed) [illegible]

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958

[illegible].

Act [illegible] ritish [illegible]
of [illegible] 7.

22nd May, 1911.

[illegible] 1st [illegible] May, 1911.
[illegible] 2nd [illegible] May, 1911.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

[illegible] for [illegible] [illegible]

Year [illegible] 40 [illegible]

[illegible] valve [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] 7, [illegible] 7 [illegible] 1, [illegible] 4, 1 [illegible] 4, 1 [illegible] 6. [illegible] as [illegible] and so [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] with any [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

This is quite hopeful.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.

22 MAY 1941

This is quite hopeful.
B 24/11
C.I.C. for information
C. 24/11

[illegible]

[illegible]

20th [illegible], 1941.

Dear [illegible],

[illegible]

[illegible]

Yours sincerely,

[illegible] has decided to use S.O.2. to fix

Colonel [illegible].

This is quite hopeful.
DB 24/10
C.C.C. for information

This is quite hopeful.
DB 24/10
C.E.C. for information
CE 24/4

[illegible]

[illegible] 4th [illegible], 1944.

I tried to get you on the phone yesterday and to-day in order to [illegible] on behalf of my [illegible] but [illegible] either of [illegible].

[illegible] to-day and [illegible] to be seen. It was hoped to follow your advice and lay the [illegible] at once, so as to make delay as short as possible. It was [illegible] through [illegible] but later, after this movement had been carried, the [illegible] of [illegible].

[illegible] the [illegible] to the [illegible] position.

3rd. H.T.N.Guitakell.

Major [illegible] Norton,
[illegible].

This is quite hopeful.
B 24/5
C.E.C. for information
C.E. 24/5

./Miss.

17th May, 1941.

[illegible] to help us in [illegible] as [illegible] to us from the United States, to [illegible] country. [illegible] you would mind my [illegible] you again in a matter of this kind.

No spare tyre time have been ordered from Messrs. Scott's [illegible], [illegible] to be [illegible] to [illegible] Rochdale [illegible], [illegible]. The spare consist of the following [illegible] valves:-

Six 3/4, six [illegible], eighteen 1.41, six [illegible], six [illegible], six [illegible], eighteen [illegible], twenty [illegible], twenty [illegible], twenty-four [illegible] ([illegible]), twenty-four 1.5, twelve [illegible].

Could you possibly ask your [illegible] (by telegram) if they can [illegible] the [illegible] to me by [illegible] or by a number.

[illegible] Bell-Barnett, [illegible],
[illegible] of the War Cabinet,
[illegible] Street,
[illegible]

This is quite hopeful.
DB 24/5
C.C. for information
CC 24/5

W/2266.

A.D./A.

CXG.7/5
Jerusalem
12.5.41.

With reference to the attached telegram I should like to record the tentative arrangement which I came to some time ago with "C", who raised with me the question of S.O. communications. The proposal was as follows :-

16.5.41.

FROM: AD/Z

I should be most grateful if you could through your usual [illegible] most urgently required by our Wireless Department.

[illegible] Radio, whose representative in 48-land is T.R. McElroy, 100 Brookline Avenue, Boston, and are as follows:-

Six 954, six 955, eighteen 1B51 six 6H6, six 6J5, six 956 [illegible] 3A8 (G.T.) twentyfour 1R5, twelve 7G7/1232.

This is quite hopeful.

[illegible] for a [illegible]

[illegible]/38.

A.D./.

C.O.S. 5
Jerusalem
1.8.41.

With reference to the attached telegram I should like to recommend the tentative arrangement which I came to some time ago with [illegible] raised with me the question of S.O.S. communications. The proposal was as follows:-

That S.O.S. should have their own cipher department and their own ciphers but they would only correspond by this means with their representatives in other Missions abroad. This would be reserved for all telegrams which, for one reason or another, S.O.S. did not want to go through the ordinary "C" machine. Small telegrams even to the cases mentioned above would, however, continue to be sent by "C". Further, the S.O.S. representatives in Jerusalem and [illegible] would be [illegible] to correspond between themselves by cipher only use "C", or send the telegrams here for retransmission by us.

I think that this proposal is sensible for a number of reasons. In the first place, to continue our right to correspond with our own representatives to anybody else would, as a matter of fact, be [illegible] normally see "C" himself informed of such correspondence. In the second place it seems to me that [illegible] wanted [illegible] for us to get [illegible] communications [illegible] to handle all our communications. In the third place the [illegible] delay [illegible] secret by ciphers is very [illegible] cant one [illegible] experience. [illegible] anxious to work in with "C" as much as we can do so without sacrificing our own interests.

1 [illegible] 1.

This is very hopeful.
B 24/5
C.C.O. for information
C.O. 24/5

Secret & Personal.

M.T195. 6th May, 1941.

I was delighted to receive your letter of the 5th May, saying that you had been able to provide C with the necessary operators, and I send you the warmest thanks of S.O.E. for your powerful and successful intervention.

I must protest, however, that I do not think I ever said that you did not appreciate our organisation! All I went so far as to suggest was that you might, not unnaturally, give preference to the Service Departments over S.O.E.

As it is, we are really beginning to see a ray of light at the end of our tunnel and we shall always remember that this ray was in fact, provided by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

(Sgd.) GLADWYN JEBB.

The Right Hon. Lord Hankey, G.C.B.
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
55, Whitehall, S.W.1.

P.S./-

[illegible] I [illegible] realized in my case be[illegible] [illegible] only [illegible] in. However, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] specifically [illegible] things were progressing satisfactorily.

This is quite hopeful.
B 24/5

C.C.O. for information

6 MAY 1941

Reference

REGIMITE)

He said he was most [illegible] that the Italian mentality would be such as to [illegible] strategic points in Abyssinia [illegible] the most [illegible] in dealing with Italian [illegible] strategic [illegible] Abyssinia [illegible] he said he [illegible] the [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] back in [illegible] early in April. We will see [illegible] first. We can only spare about [illegible] for C.D. [illegible] this station [illegible] is ready to start with [illegible] a [illegible] night [illegible] the return. We can't think taking [illegible] on existing station. I will find out more when I get [illegible]. You, & C.D. can confer on tactics before then.

H.D.

[illegible]

I saw [illegible] yesterday.

The spare [illegible] station is S. Massachusetts.

The other [illegible] asked to dine with C.D. in the Nantucket. I asked C.G.O. The application [illegible] seems to our Embassy inopportune. [illegible]

The spare against N. Carolina. I forwarded [illegible] my views. [illegible] [illegible]

H.D.

[illegible]

This is quite hopeful.
PB 29/4

"C.C. for information"
C.C. 29/4

P.J. (on return)
Your last poke has stirred him a bit! Do it again.
But does he realize he's been betrayed by us & C?
T.D.
27/4

6 MAY 1941

AVIAEMBASSY
WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

y, 1941.

to hear that
found the
and
n that I
sation!

Satisfactory. Copies send.
S
PB V.

ure t at this was the proper way
that such a station should be built by
, and that it should be run
lirus as the base is at

would be strenuously opposed
ay our plans to meet and over-

ns:

be put up in concrete form

accompanied by a technical
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station in the Shetl
e would need to draw upon
the equipment necessary to

sition up as one which would
nd that in doing

uld all have to be t
tion in any event, so
ct from Norway.

ssible to find the necessary
endent station of this kind.

oints are as follows:

information required from him,
.S.S. suggested that it should
discussion with me he was
of establishing such a station.

ans questions w

have an state discussion
is further.

same length and
be to a road

ested to him that the bes
the Norwegian Foreign Minister with a r
obtain say two wireless operators from

This is quite hopeful.
B 29/5

C.E.C. for information
Co 29/5

5 MAY 1949

FROM THE
CHANCELLOR OF THE
DUCHY OF LANCASTER

WHITEHALL, S.W.1

Secret.

February, 1949.

My dear Hawtrey,

[illegible]

Yours ever,

Hawtrey

This is indeed satisfactory.
Copies to Bank, S of S & C/P.
B.V.

This is quite hopeful.
D. 24/4

C.E.O. for information
CO 26/4

26.4.41.

To: AD/A & CD.
COPY to E.

From: S.

I saw A.C.S.S. this morning at Broadway, and by proceeding carefully on the lines followed by CD yesterday and asking for his views, I got him to put forward himself the suggestion that there should be in the Shetland Islands a separate radio station for communication with Norway.

He told me that he was sure that this was the proper way out of our difficulty, that such a station should be built by E, if he was able to take on the job, and that it should be run jointly for C and S.O.S. on the same lines as the base is at present.

He warned me that the proposal would be strenuously opposed by Gambier Parry, and said we must lay our plans to meet and overcome opposition from this quarter.

He made the following suggestions:

(a) That the suggestion should be put up in concrete form in a letter from CD to C.S.S.

(b) That the letter should be accompanied by a technical note from E as to the advantages which would accrue from the establishment of a separate station in the Shetlands, and as to the extent to which he would need to draw upon C or other outside sources for the equipment necessary to build such a station.

(c) That we should put the proposition up as one which would assist C to deal with his immense burden, and that in doing so we should be prepared to answer the objection by Gambier Parry that such a station would not really save him anything as the messages which were received would all have to be transmitted to London through his organisation in any event, so that he might as well take them in direct from Norway.

(d) That we should be prepared to counteract Gambier Parry's obvious objection that it would be impossible to find the necessary wireless operators for an independent station of this kind.

My comments on these various points are as follows:

(a) If E will let me have the information required from him, I will draft the letter. A.C.S.S. suggested that it should contain a statement that after discussion with me he was personally strongly in favour of establishing such a station.

(b) I should like to discuss these questions with E in the immediate future.

(c) Here again I should like to have an immediate discussion with E before the matter proceeds further.

(d) I discussed this point with A.C.S.S. at some length and finally suggested to him that the best way would be to approach the Norwegian Foreign Minister with a request that he should obtain say two wireless operators from Norwegian merchant ships

which/

which had been sunk or damaged, to do the work. A.C.S.S. and I considered carefully the objections on security grounds which Gambier Parry would be likely to put forward in opposition to such an arrangement, and we felt that these objections could be overcome with careful handling.

May I please have authority to proceed on the lines that I have indicated?

S.

S.

Yes. Go right ahead with it & good luck

RAB

24.4.41

8th April 1941

WHITEHALL 3400

FROM THE
CHANCELLOR OF THE
DUCHY OF LANCASTER.

23 APR 1941

This is a useful talk with Lord Hankey with NIT [illegible] C/W

S.O. [illegible]

23/4

55, WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

MOST SECRET.

22nd April, 1941.

Gladwyn.

W.

C/D

The letter from Lord Hankey, of which I enclose a copy herein, must be the result of General Hayning's conversation with him yesterday.

It is at least encouraging that Lord Hankey should say that he is not at all unhopeful about the operators.

23rd April, 1941.

H.M. Gladwyn Jebb, Esq.,
MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

5th April 1941

WHITEHALL 3400

FROM THE
CHANCELLOR OF THE
DUCHY OF LANCASTER.

23 APR 1941

55, WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

MOST SECRET.

22nd April, 1941.

My dear Gladwyn,

The Chiefs of Staff have passed your most secret letter (W.1951) of the 12th April asking for some additional operators for S.O.E. to me.

I am not at all unhopeful about the operators, though I hope that the demand for radio mechanics will be limited as much as possible. I do not endorse your view that "there is little, if any, hope of obtaining additional men through him" particularly as the number is so small. I think you do me an injustice in saying that I put "the needs of the Service Departments first and those of the S.O.E. second!" *I put you very high!*

However, I have written to Menzies and asked him to let me know in detail the sort of men he requires, and I shall certainly do my utmost to find them for him. I will keep you in touch with the result of my inquiries.

Yours ever,

Hankey

H.M. Gladwyn Jebb, Esq.,
MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.